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Fully informed? A methodology for assessing covert informant coverage in policing and law 
enforcement 
Colin Atkinson, University of the West of Scotland 
Abstract 
The use of covert informants has become a mainstay of contemporary policing in the United Kingdom 
as police, security and enforcement agencies tackle a range of crimes. Within such agencies, the need 
to understand the extent to which covert informants can provide information on issues of interest has 
become essential to effective practice. Drawing upon social penetration theory, this article proposes 
a new methodology to support police and law enforcement agencies in systematically mapping the 
breadth and depth of informant coverage. The future testing of such a methodology in practice will 
represent a critical area for further development and debate. 
Keywords 
Informants, covert policing, intelligence, analysis, social penetration theory 
Introduction 
The use of informants has become a mainstay of contemporary policing in the United Kingdom (UK) 
as police, security, intelligence and enforcement agencies seek to tackle a range of crimes. Covert 
informants are oftentimes referred to in these fields of practice as agents or ‘sources’ (Ingle and 
Staniforth, 2017: 124). Outside of such fields, and particularly among criminals, they are pejoratively 
termed grasses, touts, snitches or rats. From this rich and varied vernacular, Ben Fitzpatrick (2009) has 
highlighted the emergence of the specific legislative term Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS); a 
new nomenclature that Charl Crous (2009) has suggested is indicative of the modernisation and 
professionalisation of police–informant relationships. Developments over the past two decades have 
resulted in the formal regulation and professionalisation of police informant work, but the use of 
informants in policing has a long history (see Clark, 2007: 431; Shane, 2016: 2). In fact, in the ‘house 
of high-policing’ (Sheptycki, 2007), with its focus on crimes such as terrorism and organised crime, this 
tactic has long been considered as ‘typical’ (Manning, 2016: 25). Beyond the traditional use of 
informants in high policing, the tactic is now also commonplace in everyday ‘low policing’ both within 
and beyond the police service itself.1 The current legislative framework in the UK – manifest in the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) 
Act 2000 – provides the legitimacy and statutory footing for both high and low policing actors to legally 
use informants in intrusive surveillance operations (Williamson, 2008: 3). 
Despite the long-held proclivity by policing and law enforcement agencies in the UK and beyond to 
use covert human informants (Innes, 2000: 358; Schreiber, 2001: 301), academic inquiry in this area 
has been relatively circumscribed, not least due to the difficulties of researching this hidden area of 
practice (see Norris and Wilson, 2016). Such a situation is particularly lamentable given the attention 
initially afforded to this topic in some of the pioneering texts of police studies (see Manning, 1977; 
Skolnick, 2011), and it remains reasonable to concur with Basia Spalek (2014: 831) that research into 
the role and use of CHIS is rare. Within the small number of studies dedicated to understanding 
informants in policing and law enforcement, there has been a tendency to focus upon the legal 
frameworks regulating this activity or the ethical implications of this tactic (see Cooper and Murphy, 
1997; Gill, 2009; Harfield, 2009; MacVean and Neyroud, 2012; Omand, 2006; Shane, 2016). 
Nevertheless, a smaller subset of studies, covering a range of jurisdictions, has discussed the day-to-
day practice of police informant work and the use of this tactic in policing operations (see Bacon, 2016; 
Billingsley, 2009a, 2009b; Crous, 2009, 2011; Dabney and Tewksbury, 2016; Innes, 2000; Lowe, 2015; 
Rajakaruna et al, 2013). A recent and still developing literature has also emerged in the discipline of 
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psychology, particularly coalescing around the evaluation of methods used to gather human 
intelligence (see Evans et al., 2013; Granhag et al., 2015; Oleszkiewicz et al., 2017). 
A recent study (Atkinson, 2019) has highlighted the emerging role of intelligence analysis in police 
informant work in Scotland, and particularly the involvement of civilian intelligence analysts both in 
the targeting of prospective informants and in developing an understanding of the ‘coverage’ provided 
by existing informants. Informant coverage is understood in this context as the extent to which 
existing informants – the informant ‘stable’ – have access to, and can provide reporting on, the people, 
places and other entities of current and emerging investigative interest. Yet Atkinson (2019) also noted 
how analysts involved in the assessment of informant coverage lacked a commonly shared, well-
recognised, rigorous and robust methodology to underpin such everyday practice, often leaving 
analysts to devise such methodologies in isolation. Further reflecting upon the empirical research 
outlined by Atkinson (2019) – which drew upon semi-structured qualitative interviews with 19 serving 
or recently retired practitioners with experience of police informant work in Scotland, identified 
through a convenience sampling procedure, and with the analysis of these data enriched by the 
author’s prior experience as a practitioner in this field – this article proposes a methodology for 
practice that allows police and law enforcement agencies to systematically map the breadth and depth 
of covert informant coverage in their investigations and across the wider threat landscape. 
Importantly, the particular methodology advanced in this article allows not only for a comprehension 
of informant coverage but also for a developed understanding and prioritisation of gaps in this 
coverage.2 This methodology, while practitioner focused, uniquely draws upon, and is underpinned 
by, Altman and Taylor’s social penetration theory; and in doing so, it injects some explanatory power 
into, and invigorates, what has hitherto been a largely atheoretical area of police research and policing 
practice. Importantly, it is necessary to highlight that this methodology has not been subject to testing 
in its current form. Instead, this article seeks to offer analysts the theoretical grounding and practical 
support to integrate this promising methodology – or a version thereof – into their own practice. In 
doing so, it is recognised that the future testing and evaluation of such a methodology in practice will 
represent a critical area for any further development and debate. 
Theoretical framework 
Applying theory to any empirical research is useful as it deepens an explanatory analysis, rather than 
simply offering a descriptive account of a given social phenomenon. Yet, as recently as 2016, Dabney 
and Tewksbury, in their ethnographic study of informants in the United States, noted that ‘more 
theoretical development is needed’ in the study of informant work in policing and law enforcement 
(Dabney and Tewksbury, 2016: 188). They also contended that, 
Despite its central presence in past and present-day law enforcement, confidential informant usage is 
largely understudied and underappreciated. While there exists a substantial body of literature aimed 
at providing technical assistance and training to law enforcement officials who are inclined to enlist 
the aid of confidential informants in their policing efforts, much less attention has been focused on 
the sociological underpinnings of the phenomenon. (Dabney and Tewksbury, 2016: 16–17) 
The methodology proposed in this article seeks to offer technical assistance to those agencies seeking 
to understand informant coverage, but does so in a way that is theoretically informed. In particular, 
this article proposes that social penetration theory, as popularised in the work of Irwin Altman and 
Dalmas Taylor (1973), offers a promising framework through which police informant work can be both 
described and explained. 
Altman and Taylor’s social penetration theory is an approach to understanding the development of 
interpersonal relationships, with a particular focus upon the dynamic way in which these relationships 
move from relatively shallow forms of communication and exchange towards more intimate relations. 
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The principal mechanism through which this progression works, as noted by Altman and Taylor and in 
an earlier study by Taylor (1968), is mutual self-disclosure; the socially appropriate forms of which are 
embedded within a series of relationship stages. These stages of relationship development in social 
penetration theory are ordered sequentially as follows: orientation, exploratory affective exchange, 
affective exchange and stable exchange (Altman and Taylor, 1973: 136–141). Altman and Taylor 
evocatively illustrate these stages through their use of the ‘onion analogy’, wherein interpersonal 
relationship development can be characterised as penetrating through mutually layered personalities, 
with each layer corresponding to a particular set of contextual conditions. This is illustrated in Figure 
1.
 
 
Figure 1. A social penetration theory model of interpersonal relationships. 
 
During the orientation stage, interactions occur at the periphery of personality, often in public areas 
or social gatherings. Such interactions are characterised by their superficial and polite nature; 
reserving of one’s own personality and cognisant of the norms of the social context in which they 
occur, with any forays into the personality of others being both tentative and basic. Self-disclosure 
here is often limited to the visible body, dress and style. As interpersonal relationships develop into 
exploratory affective exchange, this second stage is characterised by an expansion in the richness of 
communication and an increasing, but still limited, synchronicity of dyadic exchange across both 
speech and nonverbal exchange. Communication here is smoother and more detailed than previously 
experienced, with increasing spontaneity and voluntariness of exchange. Altman and Taylor 
characterise relationships at this stage as generally friendly, casual and relaxed, and they and 
recognise that many relationships will not proceed any further. Where relationships do deepen, the 
third stage of the social penetration process is exploratory affective exchange; a stage akin to a close 
friendship or courtship, within which interaction at the outermost layers of personality is free and 
loose, with heightened activity at intermediate and more private layers of personality. Exchange at 
these newly uncovered layers may still be somewhat guarded, yet balanced by a willingness to open 
oneself and reciprocate with the other. Having established exploratory affective exchange, a small 
number of relationships will develop to stable exchange. Altman and Taylor state that stable exchange, 
a stage achieved in only a few relationships, is characterised by openness, ease and spontaneity of 
communication through both verbal and non-verbal means at outer and intermediate layers of 
personality. Similarly, this richness of communication emerges as characteristic of dyadic 
Stable exchange
Affective exchange
Exploratory 
affective exchange
Orientation
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communication at the private areas of personality, with disclosure at these core areas involving the 
sharing, or knowledge, of very private feelings and closely guarded possessions. 
 
For Altman and Taylor, the social penetration model is, in practice, neither as linear nor simple as the 
model suggests; relationship development is instead likely to be subject to spurts, slowdown, plateau 
and further progress, with no discernible endpoint ever in objective reach. Crucially, Altman and Taylor 
also recognise the possibility of gradual withdrawal and disengagement in interpersonal relationships 
a process they characterise as one of ‘depenetration’, wherein the quality of relationships deteriorates 
and interpersonal exchange moves from more to less intimate areas. Such depenetration is caused by 
the relative decline of mutual disclosure, for example, emanating from conflict or stress in a 
relationship (Altman and Taylor, 1973: 178–179). This theoretical framework of the development of 
interpersonal relationships provides a strong foundation to underpin a methodology that effectively 
assesses the nature and extent of informant coverage. Specifically, social penetration theory is used 
herein to explain the nature of the interpersonal relationship between the informant and the target, 
with a view to developing a typology that can be used to understand the nature and extent of 
informant coverage. 
 
A methodology for practice 
Fully understanding the extent of informant coverage is vital to current and future practice, especially 
as criminal activity becomes increasingly complex. The author has argued elsewhere (Atkinson, 2019) 
that even within a system that seeks to develop and exploit an array of intelligence streams – including 
covert surveillance, interception of communications and open source information – the use of 
informants in policing and law enforcement will remain common practice due to both the economic 
value of this tactic and the unique nature of the information that informants can provide. The use of 
informants in policing and law enforcement is long-standing, and the deployment of this tactic is likely 
to persist in the future. As such, this article seeks to proactively shape emerging analytical approaches 
to understanding and appraising informant coverage; approaches that take practice beyond a reliance 
on the subjective appraisal of those officers most closely aligned to those informants and who may 
have a vested interest in advancing a positive account of the coverage that ‘their’ informants can 
provide (see Atkinson, 2019). In doing so, a methodology is proposed – the ‘weighted spectrum 
approach’ – that allows policing and law enforcement agencies to comprehensively understand the 
breadth and depth of informant coverage in both operational activity and the wider threat landscape, 
including a developed understanding and prioritisation of gaps in coverage. To arrive at this advanced 
methodology, it is first necessary to sketch a basic analysis of informant coverage, a ‘binary approach’, 
and an account of how such methodologies can be integrated into routine business in policing and law 
enforcement. The limitations of the binary approach necessitate the subsequent development a 
‘simple spectrum’ approach, informed by social penetration theory, before arriving at the most 
developed methodology: the ‘weighted spectrum approach’. 
 
Binary approach 
 
Any methodology for assessing informant coverage relies on a list of ‘targets’ about whom, or which, 
intelligence is required. The selection of targets should be led by a senior investigating officer (SIO) 
responsible for leading and managing an operation or investigation, and subsequently integrated by 
the analyst into the matrix of coverage.3 In Table 1 the character ‘x’ represents coverage (the source 
can provide coverage of the target) and ‘o’ signals no coverage (the source cannot provide coverage 
of the target). Targets may be people, places and other entities of current and emerging investigative 
interest (such as groups or vehicles). 
 
Binary Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 
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Informant 1 x x x 
Informant 2 x x x 
Informant 3 x o o 
Table 1: binary approach to mapping informant coverage 
 
The principal advantage of the binary approach is its simplicity: it indicates, on the basis of the current 
capabilities within an existing informant stable, of where coverage is available and where it is not. This 
approach also provides an indication of the relative resilience of the informant stable, indicating where 
coverage is extensive and provided by several informants or, on the contrary, where it is reliant on a 
smaller number of informants. Decision-making in relation to current operations (and in relation to 
the future development of the informant ‘stable’ itself) can thus be informed by an overview of 
informant coverage against each target, as well the gaps in such coverage. 
 
The effectiveness of any such methodology is contingent upon its integration into routine police 
business. As such, it is important to appreciate the processes, roles and practices that underpin such 
an approach. The initial request to begin the process of assessing informant coverage should be tasked 
by senior management to an intelligence analyst, who is then responsible for the creation of a matrix 
that features a complete list of informants (by pseudonym) and relevant targets. A request to 
complete the matrix itself (i.e. to provide an initial assessment of coverage) should be directed to 
relevant ‘handler’ for each informant, with this assessment audited and agreed by the ‘controller’ 
before onward return to the intelligence analyst. Typically, the ‘handler’ will be responsible for 
meeting with the informants in order to obtain relevant intelligence, while the ‘controller’ will 
maintain a supervisory overview of this activity and coordinate the work of the handlers under her or 
his line management. At this point, the intelligence analyst acts as a point of triangulation for this 
initial assessment, on the basis of the analyst’s access to all sanitised intelligence from each informant 
and, crucially, other intelligence streams (such as police surveillance reports, data from the 
interception of communications, open source intelligence and intelligence from other human sources 
such as police officers and members of the public). The analyst may agree with the initial assessment, 
or further dialogue between the analyst and the controller may be required should the analyst seek 
to challenge or contest that initial assessment.4 Upon subsequent clarification, the intelligence analyst 
then disseminates the completed matrix to decision makers for action. 
 
The key stages of this process, which should be embedded within a routine processual framework 
(such as National Intelligence Model-based tactical tasking and coordinating processes), are sketched 
in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Informant mapping organisational flowchart 
 
This process moves practice beyond the risks associated with handlers ‘marking their own homework’ 
and towards an assessment of informant coverage that is routinely embedded within a broader 
system of analysis and oversight. Additionally, the process tackles the perennial problem in police 
intelligence of tacit experiential knowledge residing ‘in the heads of the individual police officer’ and 
deployed only when beneficial to that officer (see Cope, 2004: 199–200; Ratcliffe, 2016: 98) through 
the creation of a more robust, accountable and organisationally resilient system in which such 
knowledge is documented, secure and searchable. 
 
This system supports a new form of practice that is radical in some respects but conservative in others. 
In recognising the potential for conflict between police officers and analysts (see Atkinson, 2017; 
Brodeur and Dupont, 2008; Ratcliffe, 2008), the initial assessment of coverage remains with informant 
handlers although the triangulation process allows the analyst the opportunity to question and clarify 
where an assessment seems incongruent with the current or developing intelligence picture. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of this approach requires a degree of diplomacy from the analyst 
to prevent the alienation of handlers and controllers, who may perceive their professional judgement 
to be under a new form of organisational scrutiny. Similar care is also required to ensure that the 
cultural environment is suitable for the integration of analysis and intelligence analysts in this area of 
policing. As Jerry Ratcliffe (2008: 215) has asserted, in the context of attempts to integrate the ‘old 
knowledge’ of cops and the ‘new knowledge’ of analysts in intelligence-led policing, the power of the 
culture of police officers has the potential to marginalise the intelligence analyst and their function. 
Any cultural resistance may be compounded by the fact that analysts are frequently considered to be 
working to the agenda of police leaders and management, rather than operational police officers (see 
Evans and Kebbell, 2012, John and Maguire, 2007: 208–209). Given such challenges, and recognising 
the forms of cultural capital (see Bourdieu, 1997: 47) that are both valued and valuable in policing, 
research has indicated the importance of selecting a suitably experienced analyst in this role (Atkinson, 
2019). Beyond any challenges relating to cultures, systems and process, the principal deficiency of the 
binary approach itself lies in its lack of sophistication. This method indicates where coverage does and 
does not reside in the current informant stable, but says nothing further about the nature or quality 
of this coverage. All coverage, and all gaps in coverage, are afforded equal status. The binary approach 
therefore, even when effectively embedded within a robust system or process, offers only a 
rudimentary basis for decision-making. 
Anlayst is tasked, 
drafts matrix 
(including informants 
and targets), and 
forwards this to the 
informant handler 
for completion
Informant handler 
completes 
assessment of 
coverage of their 
own informants and 
forwards this to their 
controller
Controller concurs 
with/amends 
assessment of each 
handler and 
forwards completed 
matrix to analyst
Analyst acts as point 
of triangualtion for 
assessment on basis 
of all available 
intelligence and 
finalises matrix 
through consultation
Completed and 
agreed matrix is 
disseminated to 
appropriate decision-
makers for 
operational action
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Simple spectrum approach 
 
To address the methodological limitations of the binary approach it is possible to develop a simple 
spectrum approach, informed by social penetration theory, where the particular type of coverage that 
each informant provides is assigned a distinct value. A basic foundation, or assumption, of social 
penetration theory is that not all dyadic interpersonal relationships can be considered equal; such 
relationships vary by their levels of intimacy and exchange, the degrees of which grow and recede 
over time. The ‘core’ areas to which such relationships may progress towards, ultimately characterised 
as ‘stable exchange’, are also the repositories of those low visibility personality items that may be best 
described as socially ‘forbidden’ or ‘undesirable’, and the disclosure of which may represent 
vulnerabilities (Altman and Taylor, 1973: 18). It is reasonable to assume that such ‘core’ layers of 
personality are also sites where criminal activity is secreted by individuals. For example, terrorism and 
organised crime – activities upon which policing and law enforcement agencies would be particularly 
keen to obtain intelligence through informants – are characterised by their inherent clandestinity. It 
is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the details and dynamics of such criminal enterprises would 
represent closely guarded secrets, not to be disclosed to those individuals who were not trusted. 
 
Developing Altman and Taylor’s ‘onion layer’ analogy, the particular forms of criminal activity that 
policing and law enforcement may seek information upon may be secreted at the innermost layers of 
an individual’s personality and are thus contained in sites to which not all informants will have equal 
access. The simple spectrum approach recognises the distinctive forms of coverage that an informant 
may provide and the ways in which this coverage, as per social penetration theory, may be considered 
as dynamic. These features are captured in conceptualising coverage ‘levels’, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Working definitions for these levels of coverage are provided in Table 2.
 
 
Figure 3: a model of informant coverage levels (adapted from social penetration theory) 
 
Coverage level Definition 
No coverage The informant cannot provide intelligence on the target. 
Peripheral The informant can provide some direct but limited intelligence on the target, 
and/or indirect low-level/contextual intelligence on the target. 
Penetrative
Developing / 
Deteriorating
Peripheral
No coverage
8 
 
Developing/ 
Deteriorating 
Developing: the informant has well-established peripheral coverage and work 
is on-going to improve access and level of reporting (but not yet penetrative). 
Deteriorating: the informant has previously demonstrated ability to provide 
penetrative coverage of the target, but access and/or level of reporting has 
deteriorated (but is not yet peripheral). 
Penetrative The informant can provide direct and comprehensive intelligence on the 
activities, and any relevant associations, of the target. 
Table 2: typology and definitions of informant coverage 
 
For ease of recording, and to facilitate further analysis, each coverage level can be assigned a numeric 
value – ‘0’ represents no coverage, ‘1’ represents peripheral coverage, ‘2’ represents developing or 
deteriorating coverage (as appropriate) and ‘3’ represents penetrative coverage – that is mapped 
accordingly. This, the simple spectrum approach to mapping informant coverage, is provided in Table 
3. 
 
Simple spectrum Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 
Informant 1 3 3 2 
Informant 2 2 2 1 
Informant 3 1 0 0 
Table 3: simple spectrum approach  
 
In providing a more detailed assessment of the particular type of informant coverage, it becomes 
easier to understand the relative health and resilience of the overall stable. For example, in Table 3, it 
can be seen that the coverage of targets 2 and 3 is provided by two informants, but that the coverage 
of target 2 is more comprehensive in comparison (as it includes penetrative coverage). The 
organisational system that underpins this model remains identical to that which supports the binary 
approach (Figure 1). 
 
In an advance over the binary approach, the simple spectrum approach recognises informant coverage 
as dynamic, allowing handlers and controllers to think about the future prospects for, and 
development of, each individual informant. For example, an interviewee who reflected upon his time 
as an informant controller remarked upon some informants as ‘the little acorns that grow into large 
oaks’ (James). Another controller highlighted how frequently informants can ‘start slow but grow in 
confidence’ (Fiona), while a handler noted that proactive informant development was ‘very common’ 
in his professional practice (Johnny). Yet despite the benefit of this approach in recognising the 
dynamism of coverage within a given informant stable – in terms of both proactive development of 
informants and any form of deterioration of coverage – a limitation of this model lies in the standard 
weighting of targets. In the simple spectrum model, each target is valued equally, irrespective of its 
importance to the operation or investigation. This is unintuitive and unsatisfactory, and also proves 
problematic in relation to gaps in coverage, which are also treated equally. 
 
Weighted spectrum approach 
 
In order to address the limitations of this simple spectrum approach, it is possible to instead deploy a 
weighted spectrum approach to the assessment of informant coverage. The weighted spectrum 
approach asks for no further work in the process of initial assessment: handlers and controllers remain 
tasked with the provision of an initial assessment of coverage against a target based on the scale 
ranging from ‘no coverage’ to ‘penetrative’. However, in the weighted spectrum approach the scores 
for each of coverage value are multiplied, by up to three times, based on the relative priority of each 
target in a given operation or investigation. For example, in Table 4 the scores for target 1 are 
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multiplied by three, the scores for target 2 are multiplied by two and the scores for scores for target 
3 are multiplied by one. 
 
Weighted spectrum Target 1 (x3) Target 2 (x2) Target 3 (x1) 
Informant 1 9 6 2 
Informant 2 6 4 1 
Informant 3 3 0 0 
Table 4: weighted spectrum approach  
 
The prioritisation of targets is decided by intelligence or investigative officers who are not involved in 
informant work. As with target selection, the prioritisation of targets should be led, for example, by 
an SIO responsible for leading and managing an operation or investigation, and subsequently 
integrated by the analyst into the matrix of coverage. A key principle of a weighted spectrum approach 
is that the priority attributed to each target can change as operation, investigation or enforcement 
activity develops. Thus, not only is informant coverage treated as dynamic, but also the relative 
importance of targets can change over time as they become more or less significant. The capacity to 
undertake such a dynamic assessment in a meaningful way hinges upon the routine embeddedness 
of the mapping of informant coverage in wider operational and tasking processes. 
 
The weighted spectrum approach is advantageous as it presents decision makers with a guide to the 
breadth and depth of coverage against prioritised targets. Additionally, it provides a detailed 
assessment of coverage upon which to make assessments of the relative health and resilience of the 
informant stable. However, a disadvantage with the weighted spectrum approach as detailed in Table 
4 is that gaps in coverage – or ‘known unknowns’ – remain numerically similar across all targets, 
irrespective of target prioritisation.5 To address this problem, it is necessary to isolate these gaps in 
coverage and weight them according to the target priority. The result of such an exercise, using the 
same assessments as detailed in Table 4, is given in Table 5. 
 
Weighted spectrum Target 1 (x3) Target 2 (x2) Target 3 (x1) 
Informant 1 - - - 
Informant 2 - - - 
Informant 3 - 2 1 
Table 5: weighted spectrum approach (gaps in coverage only) 
 
In effect, therefore, this weighted spectrum approach also prioritises gaps in coverage and thus 
indicates areas for future action in relation to addressing such gaps. As with all of the approaches to 
mapping informant coverage detailed in this article, the weighted spectrum approach may be 
presented in its raw form or distilled by the analyst into a smaller set of key recommendations that 
may be more easily digested by decision makers. Importantly, such recommendations are based on a 
thorough and accountable assessment of coverage that is embedded in wider intelligence processes 
and that engages a range of stakeholders across the system. The implementation of the weighted 
spectrum approach, as a systematic and analytical approach to understanding and assessing informant 
coverage, offers real promise for more effective policing and law enforcement practice. 
 
Discussion 
The use of the weighted spectrum approach has the clear potential to enhance other forms of analysis 
in policing that require an understanding of how well the police is positioned in relation to mitigating 
criminal threats, particularly organised crime group (OCG) mapping (see National Crime Agency, 2017). 
OCG mapping is an intelligence gathering and analysis process used by police forces and law 
enforcement agencies in England and Wales to capture details of the suspected activities, associates 
and capabilities of OCGs; the assessment of which assigns each OCG with a numerical ‘score’. OCG 
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mapping further categorises each OCG into one of several ‘bands’, reflecting the range and severity of 
the criminality to which they are linked, alongside the level of capability and sophistication of each 
group (HMIC, 2015: 36). Scotland has an analogous analytical process, serious organised crime group 
(SOCG) mapping, that mirrors, to a large extent, the principles of the OCG mapping in England and 
Wales, albeit with an underlying methodology that is distinctive to that deployed south of the border 
(see Cavanagh et al., 2016; Hamilton-Smith and Mackenzie, 2010). SOCG/OCG mapping practices 
produce a detailed picture of the footprint of organised crime as it affects local communities. Across 
the UK, each locally produced SOCG/OCG map is used to target policing and law enforcement activity 
against SOCG/OCGs at the community level, as well as contributing to the national strategic picture of 
the nature and scale of organised crime through the collation and aggregation of these data by the 
National Crime Agency. 
 
Reflecting on the genesis of OCG mapping in the mid-2000s, Stuart Kirby, then a Detective Chief 
Superintendent in Lancashire Constabulary, recalled how the introduction of OCG mapping was a 
‘milestone’ and the ‘most systematic approach ever instigated to monitor OCGs’ (Kirby, 2019: 172). In 
2008, as efforts initially began to map the footprint of organised crime in the UK, Stan Gilmour, the 
then Detective Chief Inspector of Thames Valley Police, highlighted not only that efforts to understand 
organised crime from the ground upwards will be ‘at the cutting edge of police activity for the 
foreseeable future’, but also that the development of methodologies to assist in the analysis of the 
collected data will be essential to effective practice (Gilmour, 2008: 26). In the decade since Gilmour’s 
assessment, the processes of SOCG/OCG mapping have used a mix of computer software and 
subjective practitioner judgements to provide the assessment and subsequent scoring of SOCG/OCGs. 
 
It is important to recognise the limitations of the ‘British’ approach to mapping organised crime groups. 
OCG mapping, at least in England and Wales, has attracted some critique for its inconsistencies and 
variation in implementation, in part due to a degree of subjectivity in the process (see Kirby and Snow, 
2016). The requirement to further enhance the coherence and consistency of OCG mapping as it 
relates to England and Wales was also highlighted by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate for Constabulary in 
2017 (HMIC, 2017: 19–20). In Scotland, where SOCG mapping has been broadly welcomed as a positive 
development in understanding the nature of the threat from SOCGs and the harms attributable to 
SOCGs in local communities, it is notable that the mapping process includes ‘an assessment of the 
quality and coverage of intelligence used to inform the scoring process’ (HMICS, 2015: 23). The nature 
of current intelligence coverage also forms a critical and longstanding part of the OCG mapping 
process in England and Wales, and the ‘ranking’ process therein (House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, 2011: Ev 185). Given concerns around the lack consistency in mapping processes, 
including around the subjective judgements used in areas like the assessment of intelligence coverage, 
a common methodology, such as the weighted spectrum approach, would offer a more robust method 
through which to appraise intelligence coverage against SOCG/OCGs. The adoption of such an 
approach would be particularly beneficial given that organised crime, like terrorism, is an area of 
policing and law enforcement that particularly relies upon intelligence from informants. However, 
given that, as previously noted, the Scottish system is distinctive from that practiced in England and 
Wales, a methodology to assess informant coverage may require enough flexibility to adapt to two 
distinct, but familiar, OCG mapping processes. 
 
Conclusion 
Previous research (Atkinson, 2019) has highlighted that, despite the emerging role of intelligence 
analysis in police informant work, civilian intelligence analysts have lacked a commonly shared, well-
recognised, rigorous and robust methodology to underpin their everyday practice. In this article, a 
methodology has been proposed – the weighted spectrum approach – that, in principle, allows 
practitioners to systematically map the breadth and depth of informant coverage against prioritised 
targets, which can potentially assist in effectively identifying, appraising and addressing gaps in 
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coverage in a dynamic operational and threat landscape. This methodology retains the professional 
judgement of those practitioners – handlers and controllers – in closest proximity to, and with detailed 
knowledge of, informants, allowing them to make initial assessments of the level of coverage 
informants can provide. Importantly, however, these assessments are subsequently triangulated by 
the intelligence analyst and integrated into a matrix that contextualises coverage against prioritised 
targets, creating a detailed picture of the breadth and depth of informant coverage. This methodology 
may be embedded into existing tasking and coordination processes, ultimately facilitating more 
informed decision-making at strategic, tactical and operational levels. Moreover, there is a clear 
opportunity for this methodology to complement – or, more ambitiously, to be systematically 
integrated into – SOCG/OCG mapping processes in the UK. Crucially, however, the uptake and ultimate 
success of any such methodology will depend upon future testing in practice; developments upon 
which future research focus should be directed. 
 
This article addresses, at least in part, the claim of Loftus and Goold (2012: 278) that there is a pressing 
need for further research into the everyday practices of covert police surveillance, including issues 
concerning the use of informants. The methodology proposed herein to enhance such practice is 
underpinned by an appropriate theoretical framework, thereby injecting explanatory power into, and 
invigorating, what has hitherto been a largely atheoretical area of police research and policing practice. 
In particular, this article has drawn upon Altman and Taylor’s social penetration theory – with its focus 
on understanding the development of interpersonal relationships and the dynamic way in which these 
relationships move from relatively shallow forms of communication and exchange towards more 
intimate relations – to understand and categorise the nature of informant coverage. The model of 
assessing informant coverage advanced herein extends from ‘no coverage’ to ‘penetrative’ coverage, 
recognising the dynamic nature and development of such coverage in practice. It is again recognised 
herein that the model proposed remains, at this stage, largely untested. Any implementation of the 
methodology proposed herein would thus benefit from an initial pilot project to assess its viability. 
Where such a pilot project demonstrates that the system is both robust and potentially delivers 
operational, tactical and strategic benefits, any subsequent roll-out would benefit from a subsequent 
evaluation at a suitable juncture to further assess the impact on practice. This article ultimately 
concludes by contending that just as there is a pressing need for further empirical research on the use 
of informants in policing and law enforcement, so such research can benefit from the analysis and 
insight that can be obtained by refracting such findings through theory. 
 
Notes 
1. For Jean-Paul Brodeur (2007: 27–28), high policing is characterised by the wide scope and strategic 
use of intelligence, the conflation of separate state powers, the protection of national security and 
the use of informants and undercover operatives. Low policing, somewhat analytically neglected 
in comparison, refers to policing in the Peelian tradition: the consensual maintenance of order and 
suppression of street-based crime using preventive patrol by uniformed officers visible to the 
community. 
 
2. Intelligence gaps, in this context, accord with Oliver Higgins’ understanding of ‘known unknowns’. 
Higgins (2009) notes the importance of filling such intelligence gaps, and how this task is generally 
recognised as a central feature of intelligence collection. 
 
3. It is recognised here that by focusing on agreed operational or investigative targets there is a 
potential to overlook ‘unknown unknowns’, or those emerging threats that were hitherto 
unanticipated until such problems had become established (see Higgins, 2009). 
 
4. They may even, at this juncture, recommend the de-authorisation of a particular informant on the 
basis of the analyst’s extensive exposure to a range of intelligence streams (see Atkinson, 2019). 
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5. At ‘0’, and therefore not subject to multiplication according to priority. 
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